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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of monetary policy on firms’ investment behaviour. The
analysis relies on a comprehensive database of Belgian firms covering all sectors of
economic activity and firms of all sizes. We proceed in two steps. First, we estimate a
reduced-form investment equation derived from the neo-classical model, augmented by
cash flow. This equation is estimated by the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM procedure.
Second, we compute the elasticity of the user cost of capital and the cash flow/capital ratio
to the policy-controlled interest rate. We estimate the model for various sample splits
according to sectors and sizes. Our results indicate that small firms are more sensitive to
monetary policy than large firms, and that services are almost unaffected. Since the impact
differs across sectors and sizes, we can conclude that monetary policy produces
distributional effects.
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Non-technical summary
This paper analyses two monetary transmission channels which operate through firms’
investment decisions. First, through the interest rate channel, monetary policy affects
investment through a change in the user cost of capital. Second, through the credit
channel, monetary policy affects the access of firms to internal and external finance and
the cost this entails. In a world of asymmetric information between firms and lenders,
firms have to pay an external finance premium which depends on their balance sheet
position, or rely on internal resources. A monetary policy tightening raises interest rates,
thus reducing firms’ profits and the value of capital assets that might be used as collateral
to obtain new loans. Therefore, it increases the external finance premium. Further, higher
interest charges reduce the cash flow, i.e. the internal resources available. Consequently, a
monetary policy tightening may raise the degree of financial constraints faced by the
firms.
These two channels are assessed for the whole set of Belgian firms over the period 1985-
1998. The time span of the data set has allowed us to analyse the dynamic behaviour of
firms’ investment, which is per se a dynamic process. Since we have considered the entire
panel of Belgian firms, we have examined the behaviour of firms’ investments at the
microeconomic rather than at the aggregate level. Furthermore, the scope of the data set
has allowed us to consider the individual behaviour of firms of various sectors and sizes.
The evaluation proceeds in two stages. First, we have estimated the elasticities of the
capital stock with respect to the user cost of capital and to the cash flow-capital ratio. The
former may be related to the interest rate channel. The latter may be related to the credit
channel since it may be interpreted as a measure of the degree of financial constraints, i.e.
the difficulty to appeal to external financing. Second, we have computed the elasticities of
both the user cost of capital and the cash flow-capital ratio with respect to the short-term
market interest rate. Finally, we have calculated the combined effects of the two channels
of monetary transmission on firms’ capital stock and compared them across sectors and
firms’ size.
The analysis of firms’ investment behaviour shows that: (1) large firms display a smoother
investment pattern and are more responsive to value added growth than small firms, (2)
small firms are more sensitive to the cash flow-capital ratio (except for manufacturing
firms), which may indicate more binding financial constraints, (3) services firms do not
respond to user cost fluctuations. Further, small services firms, contrary to large services3
firms, do not depend on value added growth but reply heavily on cash flow, (4)
manufacturing firms react to user cost changes, value added fluctuations and cash flow.
Small manufacturing firms are more responsive to the user cost of capital, and they do not
seem to face more binding financial constraints than large manufacturing firms, (5)
construction firms display higher elasticities with respect to the user cost than other
sectors, (6) at a more disaggregated level, the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to
value added and the user cost of capital is higher for capital-intensive sectors.
The evaluation of the effects of monetary policy on firms’ investment yields the following
results. The interest rate channel is stronger for small firms than for large firms. It
produces larger effects in construction than in other sectors and it does not affect services
firms significantly. Except for construction, the interest rate channel is larger for capital-
intensive sectors than for other sectors. The credit channel is also stronger for small firms
than for large firms, produces greater effects in the manufacturing sector than in other
sectors, and exerts no significant influence on services firms. The order of magnitude of
the credit channel is larger than that of the interest rate channel.
All in all, our results show that monetary policy has distributive effects on firms’
investment, both through the interest rate channel and the credit channel. Following a
monetary policy tightening, small firms cut their capital stock more than large firms,
manufacturing firms reduce their capital stock by a larger extent than other sectors, and
services remain essentially unaffected. The elasticity of capital with respect to interest rate
changes ranges from zero to eighteen percent.4
1. Introduction
For the conduct of monetary policy it is essential to understand the transmission
mechanism through which changes in the policy-controlled interest rate will affect the real
economy and inflation. This mechanism is, however, rather complex since it operates
through various channels and involves the behaviour of all sectors of the economy. In this
paper we focus on how business investment is affected by monetary policy. This paper is
part of the Monetary Transmission Network project conducted by EU-12 central banks
and coordinated by the European Central Bank.
The literature usually distinguishes two channels through which business investment is
influenced by monetary policy: an interest rate channel and a credit channel. The former
channel conveys the direct impact of interest rate changes on the user cost of capital and
subsequently on firms’ investment. The latter channel only operates in a world of
imperfect capital markets. Asymmetric information, moral hazard and agency costs
between lenders and the firm drive a wedge between the internal (cash flow, liquidity) and
external (debt, equity) cost of financing. Hence, firms' investment decisions are also
determined by their financing decisions and opportunities. Not all firms face the same
market interest rate; the level of the risk premium required by the lender depends on,
among other things, the capital structure of the firm as recorded in the balance sheet1
(several papers develop these ideas, starting with Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981, Myers and Majluf, 1984). Some firms may even become credit-constrained
and dependent for investment on internal resources. In such a world, monetary policy
shocks will change the risk premium required by lenders if the shocks alter the net value
of a firm and thus its ability to provide collateral. In addition, monetary policy shocks can
affect the level of internal resources available by, for instance changing the amount of
available cash flow.
In this paper we investigate the importance of both channels using a large panel of Belgian
firms. Several reasons can be put forward for the use of micro-data rather than of
aggregate data. First, micro-data contain a larger body of information. Second, they are
closer to economic theory. Third, disaggregated data record firms in different financial
positions. Fourth, panel data also allow us to control for both time-varying and firm-
specific effects, which aggregate time series or cross-sectional data cannot do.
                                                     
1  The (broad) credit channel is therefore also called the balance sheet channel.5
Following Bond et al. (1997) or Mairesse et al. (1999), we estimate a reduced-form
investment equation, which is derived from the traditional neo-classical model of
investment (Jorgenson, 1963). In this model, investment is solely a function of sales and a
user cost. In contrast to Bond et al. (1997) we use a firm-specific user cost of capital.
Adjustment costs, installation lags and expectations regarding future returns, which are
inherent in the investment decision, are captured by the introduction of lagged variables.
As in the extensive empirical literature pioneered by Fazzari et al. (1988), we also
augment this neo-classical model by the cash flow/capital ratio. The coefficient for cash
flow may be interpreted as an indication of the degree of financial constraints, since
investment of credit-constrained firms is more sensitive to the availability of internal
funds, i.e. cash flow. This interpretation should, however, be treated with caution, as
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) have shown that it may be misleading, because cash flow may
be correlated with firm profitability, and since current profits can be interpreted as a proxy
for profit expectations. In this case, cash flow captures profit expectations rather than
credit constraints.
 In light of the Lucas critique (1976), another strand of empirical research on investment
adopts a more structural approach and tries to derive a tightly parameterised model from
the firm’s intertemporal optimisation problem under explicit assumptions (e.g. an explicit
adjustment cost function, often quadratic, or the introduction of binding credit
constraints). This type of work directly estimates the Euler equation for the capital stock
(see, for instance, Bond and Meghir, 1994, Chatelain and Teurlai, 2000, Whited, 1992).
Although from a theoretical point of view this approach is more appropriate (since it
delivers policy-invariant parameter estimates), it has often failed to produce significant
and correctly signed adjustment cost parameters (see for instance, Barran and Peeters,
1998, for Belgium). Chatelain and Teurlai (2000) argue that the assumption of a
symmetric quadratic adjustment cost function may be too restrictive. Moreover, although
the Euler equation itself is structural, the variables that explain the financial constraints are
entered ad hoc after the firm’s optimisation is solved (see the criticism of Vermeulen,
1998).
In contrast to previous panel data studies, including those on the Belgian economy (see
Barran and Peeters, 1998, Deloof, 1998, Vermeulen, 1998), which generally focus on a
very limited sample of large and/or manufacturing firms, we include in our study firms of
all sectors and sizes. Moreover, our data set is comprehensive in the sense that it includes
nearly every Belgian firm. Thanks to the size and scope of our data set we can analyse the
investment behaviour of a typical Belgian firm without being subject to a representation6
bias. Moreover, we can allow for heterogeneity in firms’ investment behaviour along
multiple dimensions, whereas most studies force all firms into a "one size fits all"
investment model by pooling the data2. In this paper we estimate a specific investment
equation for each sector and size separately, and, by doing so, avoid a specification bias.
Indeed, using pooled data does not produce significant effects of user-cost fluctuations on
the investment rate, and formal tests show that this results from a specification bias. This
highlights the need for a disaggregated analysis. Furthermore, such an analysis gives us
additional information on the distributional effects of monetary policy.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 derives the reduced-form investment equation
from the neo-classical model. Section 3 describes our dataset and some features of
corporate finance in Belgium. The empirical part is split into two. Section 4 presents the
estimates of the investment equation by sector and size. Section 5 computes the impact of
interest rate changes on capital through the firm-specific user cost of capital and through
the cash flow/capital ratio. Finally, in section 6, we formulate our conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework
In order to evaluate the interest rate and credit channels we proceed in two steps. In the
first step we estimate an investment equation (4) derived from a neo-classical model. In
the second step we focus on the impact of monetary policy on the user cost of capital and
on the cash flow/capital ratio.
It can be shown, as in Mairesse et al. (1999), that the neo-classical model of a profit-
maximising firm (as pioneered by Jorgenson, 1963) leads to the following capital demand
equation, when we assume a generalised CES production function (as in Eisner and
Nadiri, 1968), no irreversibility, uncertainty, delivery lags, costs of adaptation and taxes:
(1) log(Kit) = θ .log(Yit)- σ .log(UCCit) + log(Hit)
where UCCit is the real user cost of capital of firm i in year t,
Yit represents real output ,
Hit=[TFPi.At]
(σ -1)/υ  (υα i)
σ ,  where TFPi.At stands for total factor productivity,
υ  is the elasticity of scale,
                                                     
2  Applying recent work by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) constitutes an improvement in this respect since
they only impose long-run homogeneity and allow the short-run dynamics to vary across groups.7
σ  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour,
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Equation (1) represents the equilibrium value of the real capital stock. As can be shown
from the expression for θ,  the long-run elasticity of capital to output is unity when σ =1
(Cobb-Douglas) or when υ =1 (constant returns to scale).
Assuming a partial adjustment process of order p, we obtain the following autoregressive
distributed lag (ADL) capital demand equation3:
(2) log(Kit) = ϖ 1. log(Kit-1) + ϖ 2. log(Kit-2) + ... + ϖ p. log(Kit-p)
 - σ 0.log(UCCit) - σ 1.log(UCCit-1) - σ 2.log(UCCit-2) - .... - σ p.log(UCCit-p)
 + θ 0.log(Yit) + θ 1.log(Yit-1) + θ 2.log(Yit-2) + .... + θ p.log(Yit-p)
 + φ 0.log(Hit) + φ 1.log(Hit-1) + φ 2.log(Hit-2) + .... + φ p.log(Hit-p)
Next, as in the usual accelerator model, we take first differences and approximate the net
growth in the capital stock ∆ log(Kit) by Iit/Kit-1-δ i where δ i is the firm-specific depreciation
rate. This leaves us with the equation :
(3) (Iit/Kit-1) = (1-ϖ 1-ϖ 2-...ϖ p).δ i + ϖ 1. (Iit-1/Kit-2) + ϖ 2. (Iit-2/Kit-3) + ... + ϖ p. (Iit-p/Kit-p-1)
- σ 0.∆ log(UCCit) - σ 1.∆ log(UCCit-1) - σ 2.∆ log(UCCit-2) - .... -σ p.∆ log(UCCit-p)
+ θ 0.∆ log(Yit) + θ 1.∆ log(Yit-1) + θ 2.∆ log(Yit-2) + .... + θ p.∆ log(Yit-p)
+ time dummies + ε it
Finally, this equation is augmented with a distributed lag of the cash flow/capital ratio,
denoted by Cashit, in order to capture financing constraints.
Equation (3) deviates from Mairesse et al. (1999) because we do not replace the user cost
by time dummies and fixed effects. Furthermore, in most studies output is proxied by
sales. However, since small firms do not have to report sales in Belgium, we use instead
value added (VAit) for all firms. If we make the assumption that value added is
                                                     
3    Rearranging this equation, as in Mairesse et al. (1999), we obtain an error correction model which
expresses the growth rate of the capital stock as a function of both growth rate and level variables.
Theoretically, this equation has more appeal, because it distinguishes between long- and short-term
effects. However, empirically capturing the long-term over a limited period of time is a perilous
undertaking.8
proportional to sales, the coefficient for output in equation (1) keeps the same structural
interpretation for value added. So, we finally obtain the following estimable equation:
(4) (Iit/Kit-1) = (1-ϖ 1-ϖ 2-...ϖ p).δ i + ϖ 1. (Iit-1/Kit-2) + ϖ 2. (Iit-2/Kit-3) + ... + ϖ p. (Iit-p/Kit-p-1)
- σ 0.∆ log(UCCit) - σ 1.∆ log(UCCit-1) - σ 2.∆ log(UCCit-2) - .... - σ p.∆ log(UCCit-p)
+ θ 0.∆ log(VAit) + θ 1.∆ log(VAit-1) + θ 2.∆ log(VAit-2) + .... + θ p.∆ log(VAit-p)
+ β 0.Cashit + β 1.Cashit-1 + β 2.Cashit-2 + .... + β p.Cashit-p
+ time dummies + ε it
Time dummies are sufficient to capture the terms in ∆ log(Hit) (since the firm-specific
effects, TFPi and α i, drop out by first differencing), but we still need a fixed effect to deal
with the firm-specific depreciation rate4. The presence of the lagged dependent variable
and the likely endogeneity of output, user cost and cash flow require an instrumental
variable approach in order to obtain consistent estimates. We use the Arellano and Bond
(1991) GMM estimator on first differences. We consider the largest set of instruments
available, i.e. second lag and beyond of the investment-capital ratio, of the first
differenced user cost, the first differenced value added and cash flow/capital ratio. For the
sake of brevity, in section 4, we present only the results of the second-step estimates,
which are robust to residual heteroskedasticity. Since equation (4) is estimated in first
differences in order to eliminate the fixed effects and since we consider four lags, we need
at least seven years of observations per firm5. The estimation therefore runs over the
period 1991-1998, and the earliest instrument is dated 1986.
3. Description of Belgian data
3.1 Sample description6
Equation (4) above is estimated using a sample of firms drawn from a database collected
by the National Bank of Belgium. The database covers nearly the entire population of
Belgian firms, since, under accounting legislation, almost every non-financial firm7 in
                                                     
4   Even assuming a non-specific depreciation rate might still require a fixed effect, when productivity growth
instead of the level is firm-specific.
5  Wald tests, reported in the tables, show that, in most of the cases, lag four is significant. Further,
preliminary estimates show that an ADL(3) model is misspecified for small firms (in the sense that the
Sargan statistic rejects the model).
6  A more detailed description of the data is to be found in Appendix A.
7  In general, except for financial intermediaries, which have to obey special rules, only natural persons are
exempted from publication of their annual accounts and all other firms governed by Belgian law are not.
More specifically, the latter group includes :9
Belgium has to deposit an annual account at the National Bank of Belgium. In 1998, for
instance, 228,566 firms met their legal obligation. On average about 10% of the Belgian
firms, however, fail to comply with this requirement, so that no information is available
for those firms. All accounts are subjected to a long list of accounting and logical
consistency controls before they enter the database. If necessary, corrections are made.
The data therefore satisfy the highest quality standards.
The annual accounts of small firms, which represent the vast majority in the database
(around 92.5% of all firms), are submitted in a different format from that of large firms
and essentially contain less information. A company is regarded as "large", in 1999, either
when the yearly average of its workforce is at least 100 or when at least two of the
following thresholds were exceeded: (1) yearly average of workforce: 50, (2) turnover
(excluding VAT) : EUR 6,250,000, (3) balance sheet total : EUR 3,125,0008. In general,
the values of the latter two thresholds are altered every four years in order to take account
of inflation. In terms of aggregate economic activity, large firms, of course, account for a
large proportion of the private sector.
Our sample draws on a period of 15 years (1985-1998)9 of annual accounts. This makes
the database suitable for studying the dynamic properties of the model. We also use an
unbalanced panel in order to avoid the survivor bias, related to balancedness, and to keep
as much information as possible, which should lead to more efficient estimates. We
selected firms for inclusion in our sample when all variables in equation (4) were available
for at least 7 years. Although we are well aware that this might introduce another survivor
bias, we give priority to the issue of dynamics. We furthermore removed outliers by
excluding firm-years for which at least one of the variables of interest (except value
added, which is scale-dependent) belongs to the first or 99
th percentile. This trimming
procedure was repeated year by year and for large and small firms separately. We are left
with a final unbalanced sample of 29,600 firms representing 157,547 observations. This is
                                                                                                                                                 
•   all limited liability companies;
•   all economic joint ventures and European economic joint ventures;
•   all unlimited liability companies if they are regarded as large and if at least one of their partners is a
legal person ;
•   all foreign companies which have a branch or a place of business in Belgium or wish to establish one
there (legal obligation until 1991).
8 The definition of a large firm is close to the EU definition of a medium-sized or large firm. At the EU
level, a firm is regarded as medium-sized if it has more than 50 employees and either a turnover higher
than 7 million euros or a balance sheet total larger than 5 million euros.
9 Actually, the data set even contains 25 years of annual accounts, starting in the mid-1970s. However, due
to changes in the accounting legislation, annual accounts before 1985 are difficult to compare to those
from that year onwards. Hence, for our analysis, we prefer to work with a more consistent data set and to
confine ourselves to the years 1985 to 1998.10
around 12% of the database, which originally amounted to more than one and a half
million observations. Although this seems a small number, most of the observations lost
are from very small (service) firms. The manufacturing firms in our retained sample
produce around 46% of Belgian aggregate value added in manufacturing. For the service
firms this is 16% of aggregate value added in services. Although there is a small bias
towards large firms in our final sample, the number of very small firms is still quite large.
Around 10% of the firms have only one employee, and 44% of the firms employ at most
five persons. At the sectoral level, manufacturing industries and construction are slightly
overrepresented in our final sample.
All in all, compared to other data sets used in the literature, our sample is still very
representative of the Belgian private sector, since there is no major representation bias
towards a particular industry (often manufacturing), size (often large firms), or some other
feature depending on the purpose for which the data are collected.
3.2 The financial structure of Belgian firms
During the past 15 years, the relative share of the different sources of corporate financing
has changed considerably, and this trend has been different for small and large firms.
Tables 1 and 2 show, respectively, the share of the main balance sheet items for the two
categories of firms. The stylised facts are the following. In general, firms rely less on trade
debt than in the past. This tendency, which, of course, is also reflected in a decline in the
items ’trade credit’ and ’inventories’, points to a more efficient use of funds. Furthermore,
as far as large firms are concerned, we observe that equity has become more important,
reaching more than 40 % at the end of 1998, that the share of long-term bank credit has
been almost halved and that non-bank loans have exploded. The share of the other liability
items remains more or less unchanged. Also debt securities (corporate bonds or
commercial paper) continue to play a minor role in the corporate financing decisions of
large Belgian companies. Small firms, on the other hand, have kept roughly the same
leverage as 15 years ago, but have shifted primarily from trade debt towards long-term
bank financing. These patterns can be explained by referring to (changes in) the
institutional features of Belgian financial markets.
In Belgium, firms’ direct access to capital markets has historically always been limited.
Few companies are listed on the stock exchange. In November 1995 the stock market
capitalisation of Belgian firms represented 44% of GDP, as compared with 93% in the US
and 130% in the United Kingdom (see Verschueren and Deloof, 1999). Furthermore,11
corporate bonds and loan markets hardly exist; commercial paper was issued for the first
time in 1991. Instead, Belgian corporate finance is characterised by the presence of large
shareholders, which often assume the structure of holding companies. They control many
firms through pyramidal and complex ownership structures. Holding companies play a
significant role not only in the financing but also in the management of their affiliated
firms. Holding companies may substitute for poorly developed corporate capital markets.
Since the presence of holding companies has a long history, this feature cannot explain the
recent trends observed in the financial structure of (large) firms. Firms may, however, also
belong to another form of group, i.e. a multinational company. In Belgium, since 1982,
multinational firms have been able to found a so-called ’co-ordination centre’. This is the
main distinctive feature of the Belgian system. Co-ordination centres are allowed to
provide support services and financial services to their affiliated firms on a low-tax
basis10. In their role of banker of the group, they have become the main source of external
finance for their members. Fiscal incentives encourage firms linked to a co-ordination
centre to transfer their retained earnings in the form of rights issues to their co-ordination
centre. The centre will transfer these funds back to these firms in the form of debt. This
mechanism explains the trends observed in the aggregate balance sheet of large firms : the
boost in equity financing, which stems from co-ordination centres, as well as the growing
importance of financial assets and other loans, which is attributable to affiliated firms.
Bank credit, being more expensive, has become less attractive.
In sum, co-ordination centres, but also holding companies, can alleviate the financial
constraints for affiliated firms through the provision of external funds at lower costs
thanks to lower agency costs (less asymmetric information) and thanks to fiscal
advantages. Access to an internal capital market has affected corporate finance. It explains
why large firms have replaced bank credit by intra-group loans. Given the legal
restrictions involved, this did not happen for small firms11.
                                                     
10  Co-ordination centres belong to the services sector; their members may belong to other sectors.
11  Only multinational groups with a consolidated capital in excess of BEF 1 billion and an annual turnover of
at least BEF 10 billion were allowed to set up a co-ordination centre.12
Table 1 : Financial structure of small firms
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
number of firms
(000)
75.2 87.0 96.1 105.6 117.2 129.5 141.0 151.2 158.0 166.8 170.1 181.8 191.9
total assets
(billions euro)
25.2 29.4 34.5 40.9 45.9 50.9 56.9 62.2 67.5 72.5 77.7 85.3 92.8
Assets as % of total
real fixed assets 32.1 33.4 35.0 35.5 38.0 38.9 40.1 41.0 41.1 41.7 41.0 40.2 39.7
financial assets 2.9 3.3 4.1 5.5 5.5 5.7 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.9 8.9 9.8
inventories 20.3 19.6 18.0 16.6 16.1 15.6 15.0 14.3 14.1 13.7 13.0 12.4 12.2
trade credit -
total
23.7 22.5 21.7 20.7 19.5 18.9 17.6 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.5 17.7 16.9
other assets 21.0 21.3 21.2 21.7 21.0 20.9 21.0 20.8 20.5 20.2 20.6 20.8 21.3
Liabilities as % of total
loans of credit
institutions
16.9 17.9 19.0 21.1 22.2 22.3 23.6 23.7 24.0 24.4 25.1 24.6 24.1
maturity < 1 year 5.6 5.4 5.4 6.4 6.0 6.0 6.2 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.5
maturity > 1 year 11.3 12.5 13.6 14.7 16.2 16.4 17.5 18.1 18.6 18.8 19.4 19.0 18.6
other financial
debt
2.8 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9
- debt securities
- other loans
trade debt 24.0 22.9 22.4 21.2 19.9 19.1 17.6 16.9 16.9 16.8 15.9 15.7 15.2
other debt 19.8 19.2 18.8 18.7 18.9 19.6 19.9 19.9 19.8 19.8 19.6 20.2 20.6
equity and
reserves
34.4 35.3 35.0 34.1 33.9 33.5 32.9 33.3 33.0 32.6 32.9 32.7 33.2
other liabilities 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0
Flows as % of assets
interest charges 2.9 2.9 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.9
net operating
profit
6.3 6.3 6.3 5.6 5.0 4.8 4.4 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.6
gross investment 11.1 11.9 13.4 13.7 13.6 12.5 11.9 10.5 9.7 9.0 8.6 8.4 8.5
cash flow 9.8 10.1 10.5 9.8 9.0 8.4 8.2 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.6 8.4
source : annual accounts13
Table 2 : Financial structure of large firms
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
number of firms
(000)
10.0 10.3 10.7 11.5 12.5 13.1 13.4 13.7 13.8 13.8 13.5 13.6 13.8
total assets
(billions euro)
135.4 157.5 186.6 226.4 254.7 281.3 297.7 309.7 325.3 342.0 355.3 396.5 447.6
Assets as % of total
real fixed assets 25.1 23.1 20.9 19.7 19.7 19.5 19.2 18.5 17.6 16.6 16.5 15.2 14.0
financial assets 13.5 20.2 22.3 23.2 25.2 25.7 25.9 27.3 28.4 28.7 30.2 29.3 31.9
inventories 17.9 14.9 13.4 12.1 11.4 10.8 10.3 9.7 9.5 9.3 9.3 9.1 8.3
trade credit -
total
24.9 21.6 20.7 19.7 18.6 17.9 16.2 16.4 16.5 16.1 16.0 16.5 14.9
other assets 18.5 20.2 22.6 25.3 25.2 26.1 28.3 28.0 28.0 29.3 28.0 29.8 30.9
Liabilities as % of total
loans of credit
institutions
18.8 19.4 18.8 19.5 19.1 17.6 17.1 16.0 14.5 14.1 14.2 13.4 13.8
maturity < 1 year 7.4 7.3 7.5 8.6 7.9 6.9 7.2 6.7 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.6 7.1
maturity > 1 year 11.5 12.1 11.3 10.9 11.2 10.7 9.9 9.3 8.2 7.8 7.7 6.8 6.6
other financial
debt
7.3 7.6 8.4 9.9 11.0 12.6 13.9 12.8 13.5 14.0 13.7 14.5 15.0
- debt securities 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.3
- other loans 5.0 4.7 5.9 7.5 8.9 10.4 11.9 10.5 11.5 12.1 11.4 12.6 12.7
trade debt 19.3 16.9 16.8 15.5 14.2 13.6 12.6 12.6 12.7 12.5 12.4 12.7 11.7
other debt 18.8 17.2 17.1 16.4 15.6 15.8 15.9 16.3 15.6 15.2 14.9 14.7 13.9
equity and
reserves
30.7 34.1 34.3 34.7 36.0 36.4 36.5 38.0 39.6 40.0 40.5 40.3 41.7
other liabilities 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.0
Flows as % of assets
interest charges 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.8
net operating
profit
5.2 4.2 4.4 4.0 3.1 2.6 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.5
gross investment 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.8 4.9 4.3 3.5 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.3
cash flow 9.4 9.6 9.8 10.5 8.4 7.8 7.1 7.3 7.1 7.6 7.2 8.4 9.2
source : annual accounts
4. Investment behaviour of Belgian firms
We have shown in previous section that our sample has an extremely broad scope. It
contains firms of all sizes and of all sectors of the economy. We exploit this feature by
estimating equation (4) over the entire sample and for different subgroups. This allows us
not only to describe the investment behaviour of a typical firm in our sample (which
corresponds roughly to a typical Belgian firm) but also to investigate the investment
behaviour of specific subgroups of firms. As will be seen below, results vary significantly
across subgroups.
We proceed as follows. In section 4.1. we estimate the investment equation for a typical
firm in our sample, and for large and small firms separately. Next, we analyse the
investment behaviour of manufacturing firms, service firms and construction firms, each14
being divided into subgroups of large and small firms. In section 4.3. we look more deeply
into why user cost elasticities might differ across industries.
4.1. Investment of a typical firm and investment by size
 We first estimate the ADL(4) model of investment augmented with cash flow, presented
in equation (4), for the complete sample. Results are presented in Table 3 (columns 2 and
3). The dynamics of the investment rate are driven by the coefficients on the lagged
investment rate. The coefficient on the first lag of the investment rate is insignificant and
its point estimate is close to zero. The coefficients of further lags are negative and
significant, albeit rather small. This indicates that bursts of investment do not spill over to
the next years, but are followed by lower investment rates two years later. This result
should not be too surprising. Results on plant level data by Doms and Dunne (1998) also
point towards periodic bursts of investment. Moreover, consider again that 44% of the
firms in our sample are very small, having at most five employees. They are thus likely to
operate only one plant, with an overwhelming investment effort in the first year of
activity. This pattern makes investment a less smooth process12.
In contrast with neo-classical theory, none of the user cost coefficients is significant.
However, as will be seen below, this result disappears for certain subgroups. The growth
of value added is significant at lags 1 and 2, although the effect remains small. A 1% point
increase in value added growth causes the investment rate to increase by 0.03% point after
one year and another 0.026% after two years. The cash flow/capital ratio is significant at
lags 0, 1 and 3. The contemporaneous effect is the largest. A 1% point increase in the cash
flow/capital ratio leads to a 0.11% point increase in the investment rate.
                                                     
12  At branch level (see section 4.2.), we still find that, in general, the coefficient on the first lag of the
investment rate is negative and larger in absolute value for small firms.15
Table 3: ADL(4) investment model for large and small firms
all firms large firms small firms
 coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat
It-1/Kt-2 -0.001 -0.128  0.074***  5.789  0.017  1.602
It-2/Kt-3 -0.027*** -6.006 -0.017** -2.131 -0.019*** -3.455
It-3/Kt-4 -0.020*** -5.118 -0.006 -0.817 -0.018*** -3.910
It-4/Kt-5 -0.012*** -3.283 -0.005 -0.759 -0.011*** -2.779
Σ( It-j/Kt-j-1) -0.060*** -5.966  0.046*  1.878 -0.030***  3.000
∆ log(UCCt)  0.010  0.934  0.010  0.973  0.006  0.437
∆ log(UCCt-1)  0.007  1.362  0.003  0.484  0.006  0.965
∆ log(UCCt-2)  0.008*  1.946  0.004  0.757  0.007  1.429
∆ log(UCCt-3)  0.003  0.999  0.003  0.662  0.003  0.721
∆ log(UCCt-4)  0.002  0.694 -0.002 -0.532  0.002  0.696
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j)  0.030  1.556 0.018 1.039  0.024  1.200
Long-run elasticity  0.028  0.019  0.023
∆ log(VAt)  0.006  0.149  0.074  1.509 -0.023 -0.519
∆ log(VAt-1)  0.032**  2.457  0.049***  3.049  0.011  0.727
∆ log(VAt-2)  0.026***  3.096  0.033***  2.908  0.011  1.075
∆ log(VAt-3) -0.001 -0.128  0.009  0.857 -0.010 -1.099
∆ log(VAt-4)  0.008  1.491  0.009  1.123  0.007  1.132
Σ∆ log(VAt-j)  0.070  1.113  0.174**  2.246 -0.004 -0.056
Long-run elasticity  0.066  0.182 -0.004
CASHt  0.109***  2.750  0.067***  3.230  0.416***  5.239
CASHt-1  0.047***  3.046  0.015  1.456 -0.017 -0.606
CASHt-2  0.004  0.638 -0.003 -0.545 -0.014 -1.165
CASHt-3  0.017***  2.581  0.023***  3.984 -0.001 -0.083
CASHt-4 -0.007 -1.055 -0.001 -0.090 -0.020* -1.954
Σ CASHt-j  0.170***  6.259  0.101***  5.831  0.365***  8.161
Long-run elasticity  0.160  0.106  0.354
 statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value
No. of obs.  157547  27174  129265
No. of firms  29600  4823  25000
Sargan  145.66  0.100  131.31  0.332  135.87  0.239
Wald - lag 4  17.641  0.001  1.827  0.768  19.983  0.001
m1 -44.51  0.000 -22.07  0.000 -41.73  0.000
m2 -2.24  0.025 -0.99  0.322 -1.68  0.093
 coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat
Σ (It-j/Kt-j-1).Dconstruction -0.107** -2.333 -0.169** -2.078 -0.032 -0.580
Σ (It-j/Kt-j-1).Dservices -0.008 -0.192 -0.101* -1.850  0.076  1.595
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j).Dconstruction  0.044  0.851 -0.127** -2.088  0.022  0.323
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j).Dservices  0.029  0.665  0.013  0.297  0.011  0.149
Σ∆ log(VAt-j).Dconstruction -0.028 -0.189 -0.224 -1.521  0.063  0.410
Σ∆ log(VAt-j).Dservices -0.311** -2.417 -0.222* -1.687 -0.143 -1.054
Σ CASHt-j.Dconstruction  0.176**  2.309  0.082  1.308  0.106  1.108
Σ CASHt-j.Dservices  0.056  0.837 -0.035 -0.610  0.158  1.237
2nd step GMM Arellano-Bond estimates of the investment equation (4) over 1991-1998
the constant and time dummies are not shown
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level16
Although the above results represent the typical behaviour of a firm in the sample, it is
interesting to split the sample into subgroups and investigate the investment behaviour of
those groups separately. A first logical split of the sample is by size. The vast majority of
the firms in our sample is (very) small. This is a reflection of the fact that our sample is
drawn from a database that covers the Belgian economy practically completely. As a
consequence, large firms, although they are usually more important from a
macroeconomic perspective, carry less weight in a pooled regression together with
numerous small firms. Hence, their behaviour will be masked in such a regression.
In addition, it has also been argued that small and large firms might have quite different
investment behaviour. First, a series of papers has shown that small firms are likely to be
more credit-constrained than large firms (see, for instance, Guiso, 1997, for Italy,
Mörttinen, 2000, for inventories in Finland, Vermeulen, 2000, for Germany, France, Italy
and Spain, Wesche, 2000, for Austria). As is explained in the previous section, in Belgium
a number of large firms can alleviate financing constraints through co-ordination centres.
Although this is still under debate (see Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, for a critical note),
some authors have argued that these differences in the degree of financial constraints
imply different cash flow sensitivities. We expect cash flow coefficients to be smaller for
large firms. Second, large firms probably have more plants than small firms. Aggregation
over several plants should lead to a smoother investment pattern for large firms.
We split our sample into large and small firms and estimate equation (4) for them
separately. The results, presented in Table 3 (columns 4, 5 and 6, 7), confirm the above
conjectures. Large firms show a cash flow sensitivity that is about 3.5 times smaller than
that of small firms: the sum of the cash flow coefficients is 0.10 for large firms and 0.365
for small firms. Especially contemporaneous cash flow seems to be a crucial determinant
for small firms' investment. For a small firm, a 1% point increase in the cash flow/capital
ratio leads to a 0.4% point increase in the investment rate; for large firms this is only
0.07% point. The dynamics of small- and large-firm investment are also quite different.
The positive and significant coefficient of the by-one-period-lagged investment rate for
large firms, compared to the insignificant one for small firms provides evidence of
smoother investment behaviour by large firms. This is confirmed by a positive overall
effect for large firms compared to a negative one for small firms. Due to stronger financial
constraints, small firms might invest once they have the opportunity and available
financing, and then wait for some time for new investment opportunities and funding. We
computed for each firm the standard deviation of its investment rate over six years. The17
median of this statistic over the sample of small firms is 45% higher (0.20) than that of
large firms (0.138). Finally, the role of value added growth seems to be substantial for
large firms only. For small firms, none of the coefficients on value added growth is
significant.
Overall, the results suggest that large-firm investment is smoother, depends on
fundamentals (value added growth, i.e. the accelerator model) and is less dependent on
cash flow. Small-firm investment depends heavily on cash flow. Although we believe that
this (at least partially) reflects severe financing constraints (given that the small firms are
“very small”), it could also partially reflect the fact that cash flow is a more important
predictor of future profits for small firms than for large firms. Note that the user cost of
capital is never significant.
4.2. Investment across broad sectors and size classes
In this section we investigate differences across both sectors and size classes. We split the
large and small subgroups further into 3 broad sectors of the economy, leading to 6
subgroups. We consider the following broad sectors:
(1)  manufacturing sector: this includes food, textiles, paper, wood, metal, machinery,
transport equipment, other industries, refineries, chemicals, plastics, non-metal;
(2) construction  sector;
(3)  service sector: this includes financial services, real estate, leasing and other services
to firms, education, other services, retail sales, hotels and restaurants, and transport
and communication.
Before we estimate equation (4) for the various subgroups, we first perform some formal
testing of parameter heterogeneity across sectors by introducing dummies for the
construction and service sectors in the regression on the complete sample, as well as on
the large and small sample separately. We consider four separate regressions13 in which
we include dummy variables successively on investment, the user cost, value added, and
cash flow, for construction and for services. The bottom section of Table 3 shows the total
effects together with their t-statistic. There is evidence of marked differences across
                                                     
13  In an ADL(4) model, problems arise when the same dummies applied to all lags of all variables are not
significant. Since this procedure is not standard, we estimate, as a robustness check, an ADL(2) model
with dummies on all coefficients (except the time dummies), for small and large firms separately. We were
able to obtain estimates in this case. The results are consistent with the above findings: there are
significant differences across sectors.18
sectors in the long-term effect of the user cost and value added (especially for large firms).
Also the investment dynamics seems to differ across sectors. This constitutes the reason
for estimating equation (4) for each of the subgroups separately.
Table 4: ADL(4) model of investment by sector for large firms
manufacturing construction services
 coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat
It-1/Kt-2  0.039***  2.899  0.049***  3.235  0.066***  4.703
It-2/Kt-3 -0.035*** -3.291 -0.010 -0.766 -0.027*** -3.019
It-3/Kt-4  0.011  1.073 -0.026** -2.240 -0.017** -2.053
It-4/Kt-5 -0.001 -0.096 -0.012 -1.196 -0.011 -1.515
Σ( It-j/Kt-j-1)  0.015  0.455  0.000 -0.011  0.010  0.338
∆ log(UCCt) -0.011 -1.377 -0.034** -2.034  0.016  1.144
∆ log(UCCt-1) -0.006 -1.001 -0.027** -2.566  0.001  0.192
∆ log(UCCt-2) -0.008 -1.216 -0.029*** -3.790  0.001  0.128
∆ log(UCCt-3) -0.006 -1.249 -0.007 -0.949  0.000  0.020
∆ log(UCCt-4) -0.001 -0.247  0.004  0.831 -0.005 -1.421
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j) -0.032*** -3.181 -0.093*** -2.800  0.013  0.567
Long-run elasticity -0.032 -0.093  0.013
∆ log(VAt)  0.143***  3.825  0.008  0.329  0.072*  1.755
∆ log(VAt-1)  0.076***  4.601  0.053***  2.576  0.049***  3.109
∆ log(VAt-2)  0.073***  5.116  0.023  1.281  0.035***  2.759
∆ log(VAt-3)  0.016  1.355 -0.045*** -2.988  0.021*  1.771
∆ log(VAt-4)  0.000  0.021 -0.030** -2.286  0.006  0.625
Σ∆ log(VAt-j)  0.309***  4.403  0.008  0.118  0.183**  2.543
Long-run elasticity  0.313  0.008  0.185
CASHt  0.037**  2.044  0.114***  3.724  0.054***  2.743
CASHt-1  0.098***  6.357  0.007  0.599  0.009  0.872
CASHt-2  0.011  0.914  0.016**  2.307 -0.005 -0.880
CASHt-3  0.040***  3.437 -0.006 -0.877  0.026***  4.245
CASHt-4  0.021**  2.093  0.003  0.415  0.000  0.018
Σ CASHt-j  0.207***  4.524  0.134***  6.676  0.083***  4.815
Long-run elasticity  0.211  0.133  0.084
 statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value
No. of obs.  8158  2720  16624
No. of firms  1529  452  2826
Sargan  119.501  0.622  118.816  0.639  118.957  0.635
Wald - lag 4  4.705  0.319  13.136  0.011  4.006  0.405
m1 -11.716  0.000 -8.011  0.000 -17.400  0.000
m2  0.363  0.717 -1.221  0.222 -0.717  0.474
2nd step GMM Arellano-Bond estimates of the investment equation (4) over 1991-1998
the constant and time dummies are not shown
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level19
Table 5: ADL(4) model of investment by sector for small firms
manufacturing construction services
 coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat
It-1/Kt-2 -0.029* -1.910 -0.034** -2.320  0.018  1.456
It-2/Kt-3 -0.035*** -3.210 -0.041*** -4.177 -0.019*** -3.148
It-3/Kt-4 -0.021** -2.194 -0.047*** -5.365 -0.015*** -2.846
It-4/Kt-5 -0.028*** -3.205 -0.036*** -4.713 -0.007 -1.388
Σ( It-j/Kt-j-1) -0.113*** -2.736 -0.158*** -4.755 -0.023 -1.157
∆ log(UCCt) -0.032 -1.643 -0.075** -1.966  0.010  0.715
∆ log(UCCt-1) -0.023* -1.851 -0.023 -1.210  0.005  0.753
∆ log(UCCt-2) -0.021* -1.888 -0.002 -0.126  0.005  0.920
∆ log(UCCt-3) -0.016* -1.812 -0.006 -0.691  0.003  0.687
∆ log(UCCt-4) -0.006 -0.981  0.006  0.963 -0.001 -0.360
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j) -0.097* -1.949 -0.099 -1.293  0.022  0.985
Long-run elasticity -0.088 -0.086  0.022
∆ log(VAt)  0.095  1.623  0.029  0.504 -0.017 -0.364
∆ log(VAt-1)  0.083***  3.481  0.067***  3.269  0.008  0.464
∆ log(VAt-2)  0.041*  1.919  0.054***  3.339  0.006  0.549
∆ log(VAt-3)  0.038**  1.962  0.034**  2.452 -0.014 -1.355
∆ log(VAt-4)  0.032*  1.921  0.025**  2.242  0.005  0.761
Σ∆ log(VAt-j)  0.289***  2.656  0.208**  2.079 -0.012 -0.148
Long-run elasticity  0.260  0.180 -0.012
CASHt  0.086  1.060  0.361***  4.166  0.386***  4.274
CASHt-1  0.110***  3.036 -0.044 -1.644  0.000  0.012
CASHt-2  0.024  1.221 -0.046*** -2.880 -0.001 -0.041
CASHt-3 -0.025 -1.265 -0.018 -1.394  0.008  0.591
CASHt-4  0.005  0.238  0.014  1.042 -0.020 -1.537
Σ CASHt-j  0.200***  3.479  0.266  4.375  0.374***  6.826
Long-run elasticity  0.180  0.230  0.365
 statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value
No. of obs.  14856  25444  88220
No. of firms  3040  4648  16954
Sargan  121.649  0.568  114.515  0.739  130.063  0.360
Wald - lag 4  13.609  0.009  26.003  0.000  6.849  0.144
m1 -15.658  0.000 -19.145  0.000 -34.795  0.000
m2  1.351  0.177 -1.782  0.075 -1.873  0.061
2nd step GMM Arellano-Bond estimates of the investment equation (4) over 1991-1998
the constant and time dummies are not shown
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level
The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. It is immediately clear that the former
regression results in section 4.1. with respect to both the complete sample and the sample
of small firms are to a large extent determined by the investment behaviour of small
service firms. This is not surprising because, with more than 88,000 observations, they
represent more than 50% of the entire sample. Small service firms seem in fact not to react
to user cost changes and value added growth, but they do react strongly to20
contemporaneous cash flow changes. A 1% point rise in the cash flow/capital ratio leads
to an increase in the investment rate of 0.38% point. Large service firms are different from
small ones in that they react significantly to value added growth but much less to cash
flow changes. Again, the investment dynamics for large service firms seem smoother than
those for small ones; they react less to user cost fluctuations (although the coefficient is
more significant). Both small and large service firms seem not to react to user cost
changes (however, as will be seen below, this is not generally the case for all service
sectors). We also performed a formal test along the same lines as above, by pooling small
and large service firms and putting a dummy for large firms on the coefficients of each
variable (for all its lags) sequentially. Table 6 presents the results. The reaction to cash
flow changes of large service firms seems significantly much lower than for small service
firms.
Table 6: test of significant differences between small and large firms
manufacturing construction services
 coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat
Σ (It-j/Kt-j-1).D  0.251***  3.971  0.006  0.075  0.069  1.624
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j).D  0.020  0.327 -0.099 -1.187 -0.041 -1.231
Σ∆ log(VAt-j).D  0.200*  1.699 -0.127 -0.843 -0.030 -0.282
Σ CASHt-j.D -0.077 -1.094 -0.082 -1.285 -0.212*** -3.935
2nd step GMM Arellano-Bond estimates of the ADL(4) model of investment augmented with
dummies for large firms over 1991-1998. Four separate regressions are performed, each of which
has a dummy on all lags of one variable. The dummy D equals 1 for large firms and zero for small
firms. The table reports the sum of the coefficients of the interaction terms between the variable
and the dummy
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level
Large manufacturing firms have a smoother investment pattern and are more responsive to
value added growth than are small manufacturing firms. The investment behaviour of
large manufacturing firms seems to correspond to theoretical priors (Table 4). Large
manufacturing firms react negatively to user cost changes14 and positively to value added
growth and cash flow changes. Small manufacturing firms operate in a similar way,
except for a stronger user cost effect and less smooth dynamics. Especially, the small
difference in the reaction of both subgroups to cash flow changes is remarkable. This is
clearly different from the service sector. Construction firms seem to act quite similarly to
their counterparts in manufacturing, at least in the long run. Only the negative influence of
value added growth at lags 3 and 4 for large construction firms is rather distinctive. This
presumably reflects some kind of cyclical behaviour.
                                                     
14  Although coefficients on past user cost are not significant for large manufacturing firms, the total effect is.
This may be due to negative correlations between the coefficients.21
Although most of the existing literature focuses on large firms in the manufacturing
sector, and often estimates a different specification (for instance, one usually proxies the
user cost by fixed effects and time dummies), we try to make some comparisons with
other empirical evidence for the EU. First, our finding of a stronger cash flow sensitivity
and a less smooth investment pattern for small firms appears to be consistent with the
evidence, provided in several papers, that small firms face stronger financial constraints.
For instance, Kremp and Stöss (2000) find that in Germany small firms are more credit-
dependent than large firms. Guiso (1997) shows that the probability of being credit-
constrained decreases with size for Italian high-tech firms. Tychon (1997) indicates that
large Belgian firms rely less on bank debt, while small Belgian firms are dominated by
internal financing. Vermeulen (2000) also obtains higher cash flow sensitivities for small
firms.
Second, considering the sensitivity of large manufacturing industries to cash flow, our
estimate is close to that of Bond et al (1997).
Third, our results show a higher cash flow sensitivity for large manufacturing firms than
for large firms in other sectors. This finding seems to be in contrast with Deloof (1998)
who argues that large traditional industries may be less financially constrained thanks to
intra-group lending. Intra-group lending, for instance through a co-ordination centre, may
in fact to some extent alleviate financial constraints on member firms. This has been
shown by, among others, Barran and Peeters (1998), who estimate an investment equation
for Belgian manufacturing firms, both for those affiliated and those not affiliated to a co-
ordination centre. However since firms of the former type represent only a minor part of
the total sample of large manufacturing firms (between 5 and 7 % over the estimation
period, although a considerable part of aggregate investment), their behaviour is unlikely
to exert a substantial influence on the estimation results.
To check the robustness of our results with respect to outliers, we estimated the ADL(4)
model for a sample trimmed according to another methodology. We trim over the same
variables but consider a range of values defined by a multiple of the median absolute
deviation from the median (MAD) rather than by the percentiles. This criterion is more
robust to outliers and yields a more symmetric distribution; we adopted a conservative
threshold15. The results are reported in Appendix B. Although the order of magnitude of
                                                     
15  The sample is half the interpercentile sample, for all sectors and sizes.22
the coefficients may differ in the two samples, most of our conclusions remain valid.
Focusing on the long-run elasticities, and considering all sectors jointly (see Table B.1),
the coefficient on past investment is negative for small firms, and small firms are more
sensitive to cash flow but insensitive to value added. Distinguishing across sectors (see
Tables B.2 and B.3) the estimates indicate that (1) the sum of the coefficients on past
investment rate is more negative for small firms, (2) the long-run elasticity of investment
to user cost fluctuations is larger for small firms, and non-significant for small services,
(3) the long-run elasticity of investment to value added fluctuations is higher for large
firms, (4) the long-run cash flow sensitivity is higher for small firms.  Furthermore, (5)
construction is more sensitive to user cost fluctuations than other sectors, and (6)
manufacturing is more sensitive to value added fluctuations than other sectors.
4.3. Further breakdown by branches
As our results in the previous section clearly indicate that there are significant differences
in investment behaviour across sectors of the economy, we try to split up our sample
further into subsectors.  Our data set enables us to break down the above three broad
sectors into 23 subsectors: (1) agriculture, (2) extraction, (3) food, (4) textiles, (5) wood,
(6) paper, (7) refineries, (8) chemicals, (9) plastics, (10) non-metal, (11) metal, (12)
machinery, (13) transport equipment, (14) other industries, (15) electricity, gas and water,
(16) construction, (17) retail and wholesale trade, (18) hotels and restaurants, (19)
transport and communications, (20) financial services, (21) real estate, leasing and other
services to firms, (22) education, (23) other services.
In order to keep a sufficiently large number of firms and observations in each regression,
we do not distinguish, in this section, between small and large firms. We exclude sectors
with fewer than 200 firms, i.e. agriculture, extraction, plastics, refineries, transport
equipment, education and other services
Table 7 below shows the total effect of each variable for each subsector separately16. The
Sargan statistic accepts the model in all cases except for retail and wholesale trade; we
therefore omit this sector from the analysis. The statistic m1 has a close-to-zero p-value,
thus rejecting an I(1) process of the residuals, and there is no second order serial
                                                     
16  For the sake of brevity, we do not present full results.  These are available on request.23
correlation in the residuals (m2 statistic), except for paper, and to a lesser extent,
construction17.















Food -0.096 *** -0.061 0.115 0.374 *** 4360 797
Textiles -0.077 *** -0.063 0.124 * 0.056 * 3601 661
Wood -0.337 ** -0.054 0.105 0.393 *** 807 230
Paper -0.213 *** -0.218 *** 0.145 0.111 *** 4096 789
Chemicals -0.406 *** -0.091 *** 0.267 *** 0.092 *** 1206 225
Non-metal -0.100 *** -0.098 *** 0.100 0.240 *** 2424 412
Metal -0.310 *** -0.052 0.305 *** 0.608 *** 1851 452
Machinery -0.282 *** -0.069 0.333 *** 0.167 *** 2809 540
Other industries -0.431 ** -0.039 -0.018 0.613 ** 1037 270
Construction -0.151 *** -0.117 * 0.182 ** 0.206 *** 28322 5095
Services
Hotels and restaurants -0.115 *** -0.162 ** 0.053 0.263 *** 4764 933
Transport and
communications
-0.161 *** -0.131 ** 0.286 *** 0.226 *** 12096 2074
Financial services -0.362 *** -0.010 0.091 0.053 4005 809
Real estate, leasing and
other services to firms
-0.159 *** -0.068 0.224 *** 0.072 *** 20240 4001
Other services -0.175 *** -0.181 *** 0.319 *** 0.052 *** 6599 1338
2nd step GMM Arellano-Bond estimates of the investment equation (4) over 1991-1998
figures represent the long-run elasticity of investment with respect to the variable
except for Σ (It-j/Kt-j-1), which is the sum of the coefficients on past investment
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level
All coefficients vary substantially across sectors. The effect of past investment varies from
-0.4 (in other industries and chemicals) to -0.1 (in textiles, food and non-metal). The long-
run elasticity with respect to value added is greater for capital-intensive subsectors such as
machinery, metal, chemicals, transport and communications than for services, especially
financial services and hotels and restaurants. One exception is construction, which has a
medium-to-high elasticity in spite of a low capital/labour ratio. The long-run elasticity to
cash flow ranges from 0.6 (in metal and other industries) to 0.1 (in paper, chemicals,
                                                     
17  m1 is a specification test for first order serial correlation of the residuals. Since, equation (4) is estimated
in first difference, no first order serial correlation in the residuals implies that the error term of equation
(4) has a unit root, and that our estimates might suffer from a spurious regression problem. So, the
residuals must be serially correlated; the estimation procedure corrects standard errors for this. m2 is a
specification test for second order serial correlation. Again, since equation (4) is estimated in first
difference, no second order serial correlation in the residuals garanties no first order serial correlation of
the eror term of equation (4), i.e. that the model is correctly specified. See Arrelano and Bond (1991) for
an exposition.24
textiles, financial services, real estate, leasing and other services to firms and other
services).
Finally, the long-run elasticity with respect to the user cost varies substantially across
sectors. In a large number of cases, the total effect is not significant. This is the case, in
particular, for service sectors, which confirm the results of the previous section18. It also
applies for some manufacturing industries. As the sample is much smaller at this
disaggregated level, which may lead to a loss of accuracy, we focus on the point estimates.
The user cost elasticity reflects the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour; it
is more negative for capital-intensive sectors (such as paper, and to a lesser extent,
transport and communications) than for labour-intensive sectors (such as financial
services). There are two exceptions to this: construction and hotels and restaurants.
Excluding construction, the correlation between the total user cost effect and the
capital/labour ratio is equal to -43%19.
Gérard and Verschueren (2000) also find differences in long-run elasticity to user cost
across Belgian industries, and they also find that textiles and wood have a medium-to-low
long-run elasticity, although the order of magnitude differs from our results20.
5. Effects of monetary policy on investment
As already mentioned, in order to investigate the effects of monetary policy on
investment, we proceed in two steps. In the previous section we estimated an investment
equation. Here, we calculate the elasticity of the user cost of capital with respect to the
market interest rate and the elasticity of cash flow with respect to the market interest rate.
We ignore potential interest rate effects on value added. The long-run elasticity of capital







































































                                                     
18  An additional analysis shows that this remains valid if we distinguish between small and large firms.
19  This correlation is significant at the 12.5% level.
20  They perform a cointegration analysis on industry-level time series data over the period 1953-1996. They
do not include cash flow in the investment equation.25
where iit is the apparent interest rate faced by the firm and rt, the three-month market
interest rate. Each term of the right-hand side of this expression consists of three elements.
The first element is the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user cost (cash
flow) and is given by the estimates in the previous section. The second element represents
the elasticity of the user cost (cash flow) with respect to the apparent interest rate, and this








































where δ i is the firm-specific depreciation rate and P
I
st the sector-specific deflator on gross
capital formation. If we accept that the user cost and cash flow definitions hold on
average, we can approximate the elasticity by taking mean values (by sector and size) of
expressions (6) and (7).
Finally, with respect to the third element, the elasticity of the apparent interest rate to the
market interest rate, given that the sample period does not exceed fifteen years, we have to
recognise that the time dimension of the data is too short to capture long-run or even
medium-run trends. Thus, rather than estimating this elasticity, an alternative procedure
consists in fixing it to some arbitrarily chosen value. We postulate it to be 1, which should
correspond to its long-run equilibrium value. By doing so, on the one hand, we avoid
unreliable estimates related to low degrees of freedom estimation, but, on the other hand,
we do not capture any heterogeneity across sectors and sizes21. Fortunately, although the
precise value of this elasticity affects the size of the total effect of interest rate changes on
the capital stock, it does not alter the qualitative conclusions: i.e. the sign of the total
effect and its ranking across sectors remain unchanged, as long as the elasticity is constant
acriss sectors.
This procedure might, however, have some implications for the precise meaning of the
effects we are measuring. Usually it is considered that the effect which operates through
the user cost, belongs to the ’interest rate channel’, whereas the effect through the cash
flow variable is related to the ’credit channel’. Since we do not estimate the elasticity of the
                                                     
21  For example, Valderrama (2001) shows that banks do not cut credit but increase its cost for firms for
which they are the house bank.26
apparent interest rate with respect to the market interest rate, but just postulate that it is the
unitary value, we do not isolate the pure effects of the policy-controlled interest rate from
other influences, such as the financial structure of the firm. We therefore need to treat the
labels of the different effects with some caution.
Table 8 reports the elasticity results of the capital stock with respect to the market interest
rate, summarising the results for the three sectors and the two sizes that we consider in
section 4.2. As far as the interest rate channel is concerned, small firms cut their capital
stock more strongly following an interest rate increase than large firms do; this feature
applies for both the manufacturing and the construction sectors. When large firms of
several sectors are compared, the results show that construction firms are more sensitive to
interest rate fluctuations than manufacturing firms. For services the effect is positive and
non-significant in both size subgroups.
The next three lines of Table 8 show the elasticity of capital with respect to the market
interest rate through the cash flow variable (the credit channel) for the broad sectors
described in section 4.2. They show that investment by small firms is more sensitive than
that by large firms, in particular in the manufacturing sector. The effect is again close to
zero in the service sector. This result is mainly due to the fact that interest payments seem
to have little influence on service firms. In other words, the elasticity of cash flow with
respect to the apparent interest rate is low in service firms.
Finally, combining both channels, the last three lines of Table 8 show the total elasticity of
the capital stock with respect to the market interest rate. Obviously, the same conclusions
remain valid. Small firms reduce their capital stock to a greater extent following a
monetary contraction, especially in the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing and
construction sectors are the most sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, while services are
almost unaffected.27
Table 8: Total elasticity of capital with respect to the market interest rate
all firms manufacturing construction services
through the user cost (interest rate channel)
large firms  0.002 -0.005 -0.011  0.001
small firms  0.004 -0.018 -0.015  0.004
all firms  0.005
through cash flow (credit channel)
large firms -0.027 -0.058 -0.050 -0.007
small firms -0.123 -0.082 -0.054  0.004
all firms -0.110
total elasticity of capital with respect to the market interest rate
large firms -0.024 -0.063 -0.060 -0.006
small firms -0.119 -0.100 -0.069  0.008
all firms -0.105
source: authors’ calculations
the effect of the interest rate channel is computed combining equations (5) and (6) with dKit/dCashit
set to zero.
the effect of the credit channel is computed combining equations (5) and (7) with dKit/dUCCit set to
zero.
Our outcome for the Belgian manufacturing sector is consistent with Wesche’s (2000)
results for Austria, or with Ehrmann’s (2000) conclusions, derived from a structural VAR
analysis, for Germany. Both papers show that small firms suffer more from a monetary
contraction than large firms. Also the fact that investment by construction firms reacts
more strongly to interest changes is not too surprising, as demand in this sector is interest-
sensitive.
Other papers of the Monetary Transmission Network project also highlight distributional
effects of monetary policy. Except for France, the results confirm our findings that small
firms are more strongly affected by monetary policy than large firms are. For Italy, Gaiotti
and Generale (2001) find, as we do, that small firms have greater long-run elasticity with
respect to the user cost and cash flow. The same result applies for firms with less tangible
assets (which implies less collateral). For France, Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) obtain
evidence that equipment goods firms, firms with a low trade credit share and risky firms
are more sensitive to cash flow than other firms. For Germany, von Kalckreuth (2001)
show that firms with a high credit rating are less sensitive to cash flow and more sensitive
to the user cost, and that small firms are more sensitive to the user cost (although not
significantly so). For Austria, the results of Valderrama (2001) reveal that firms which
have a house bank are less sensitive to cash flow but more sensitive to the user cost.
Further, this author’s point estimates suggest that young firms may be more sensitive to
the user cost and cash flow. For Luxembourg, Lünnemann and Mathä (2001) find that
young firms are more sensitive to cash flow, the user cost and sales growth.28
We also perform an analogous exercise for the 15 branches analysed in section 4.3. Table
9 summarises these results. For the interest rate channel, the elasticity of capital to the
market interest rate varies from -0.07 to around zero. It is more negative for capital-
intensive sectors than for labour-intensive sectors. This negative relationship is plotted in
Figure 1. Excluding construction, the correlation coefficient between this elasticity, ε K,r
and the capital/labour ratio, K/L22, is equal to -42%23. The effects of the credit channel are
stronger. The elasticity of capital with respect to interest rate changes through cash flow
ranges from -0.18 (for wood and metal) to -0.01 (for financial services and other services).
Finally the total effect of the interest rate and credit channels ranges from -0.20 to a close-
to-zero value (especially for services).
Table 9: Total elasticity of capital with respect to the market interest rate by branch
interest rate
channel
credit channel total effect K/L
Manufacturing
Food -0.020 -0.100 -0.121 46
Textiles -0.033 -0.026 -0.059 26
Wood -0.024 -0.152 -0.176 37
Paper -0.069 -0.037 -0.106 52
Chemicals -0.039 -0.031 -0.070 63
Non-metal -0.031 -0.072 -0.103 50
Metal -0.019 -0.176 -0.196 36
Machinery -0.025 -0.031 -0.056 27
Other industries -0.012 -0.086 -0.098 32
Construction -0.039 -0.063 -0.102 20
Services
Hotels and restaurants -0.046 -0.026 -0.072 29
Transport and
communications
-0.037 -0.039 -0.076 61
Financial services -0.003 -0.007 -0.010 32
Real estate, leasing and
other services to firms
-0.021 -0.020 -0.041 42
Other services -0.045 -0.014 -0.059 48
source: authors’ calculations
the effect of the interest rate channel is computed combining equations (5) and (6) with dKit/dCashit
set to zero.
the effect of the credit channel is computed combining equations (5) and (7) with dKit/dUCCit set to
zero.
                                                     
22  The capital/labour ratio is constructed as follows.  The real capital stock is computed using the perpetual
inventory method.  It is expressed in millions of 1995 BEF expressed in euros.  Employment data
collected in annual accounts represent the number of employees (not expressed in full-time-equivalent),
averaged (over the year) before 1996, and the end of the year since 1996.
23  The correlation is significant at the 12.5% level.29
Figure 1: Elasticity of capital with respect to the market interest rate

















This paper investigates some of the effects of monetary policy on firms’ investment
behaviour. In particular, we confine our analysis to effects that operate through changes in
the user cost of capital and cash flow, and that, with some caution, can be identified with
the usual interest rate and crredit channels of monetary policy.
The analysis relies on the use of a comprehensive database of Belgian firms over the
period 1985-1998, covering all sectors of economic activity, and firms of all sizes. This
database enables us to investigate this issue for each sector and for large and small firms
separately. Taking into account the heterogeneity among firms enables us to avoid
possible aggregation biases and to find evidence for distributional effects of monetary
policy across sectors and sizes.
We proceed in two steps. First, we estimate an ADL(4) version of a reduced-form
investment equation, derived from the neo-classical model, including the firm-specific
user cost of capital and augmented with cash flow. This equation is estimated with the
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM procedure. Second, we compute the elasticity of the
firm-specific user cost of capital and the cash flow variable to the policy-controlled
interest rate.
With respect to the first step, we begin by estimating the model for the complete sample.
The results suggest that investment is not a smooth process, and that the user cost has no30
significant role to play, in contrast with value added and cash flow. Then, we split our
sample into large and small firms. This procedure can be justified by several
considerations. First, as the vast majority of the firms in our sample are small, large firms
carry less weight in a pooled regression, and hence their behaviour will be obscured. In
addition, it has been argued that small and large firms might have quite different
investment behaviour : for instance, small firms are likely to be more credit-constrained.
Overall, our results indicate, in this exercise, that large firms’ investment is smoother,
depends more on value added growth, and less on cash flow. Small firms’ investment
depends heavily on cash flow (which indicates that they may be more financially
constrained) but not on value added. The user cost does not seem to be important for
investment by either large or small firms’ investment
Next, we split our sample further into three broad sectors of the economy. From the results
it is immediately clear that the previous regression outcomes are to a large extent
determined by the investment behaviour of small service firms. Both small and large
service firms seem not to react to user cost changes. Small service firms do not react to
value added growth either, but they do respond strongly to contemporaneous cash flow
changes. Large service firms are different from small ones in that they react significantly
to value added growth but much less to cash flow changes. Again, the investment
dynamics for large service firms seem smoother than for small ones. The investment
behaviour of manufacturing and construction firms seems to correspond to theoretical
priors. They react negatively to user cost changes, and positively to value added growth
and cash flow changes. Small firms in these sectors show stronger user cost effect and less
smooth dynamics.
Since our results indicate that there are significant differences in investment behaviour
across sectors of the economy, we try to split up our sample further into subsectors. All
coefficients vary substantially across sectors, as would be expected. The long-run
elasticity with respect to value added is, in general, greater for capital-intensive industries.
The long-run elasticity with respect to the user cost is, in a large number of cases, not
significant. This is true, in particular, of service sectors, which confirm the results of the
previous sample split.
We then start the second step of our analysis and calculate the elasticity of the user cost of
capital and the elasticity of the cash flow with respect to the market interest rate. We
finally combine these computations with the estimated user cost and cash flow effects in
the investment equation, to obtain an idea of the total interest-rate sensitivity of capital.31
The magnitude of the credit channel seems more important than that of the interest rate
channel. Small firms are more sensitive than large firms. Large construction firms have a
higher elasticity than large manufacturing firms. Services are almost unaffected.
In sum, the results support, in general, the hypothesis of an interest rate and credit channel
in Belgium. The impact of these channels differs across sectors and sizes. We can thus
conclude that monetary policy produces distributional effects.
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 Appendix A : Data
A1. Sample selection and representativeness of the sample
From the original annual accounts database of the National Bank of Belgium we construct
our sample according to several criteria, as described in Table A.1. In a first step we select
the profit-maximising firms. We therefore exclude firms that do not belong to the market
sector. To be more specific, we eliminate annual accounts of foreign and public
companies and of non-profit associations. This leaves us with 99.7% of the initial sample.
Second, we retain only the firm-years with strictly positive total assets, fixed assets and
depreciation rate. Annual accounts that do not meet this requirement may be consistent
purely accounting-wise, but are usually submitted by firms that are close to bankruptcy.
The remaining observations represent around 90% of the initial sample.
Third, we impose that all variables (investment/capital ratio, cash flow/capital ratio, user
cost of capital and value added) are available, not only in levels but also in first
differences. This means that for each firm there must be at least two consecutive annual
accounts and that user cost of capital and value added variables must be strictly positive,
since they appear in logarithm form in the equation. We call this our first reference
sample. It already represents less than 50% of the initial sample. Next, we trim the
variables for outliers by dropping the first and the 99th percentile of the level and first
difference. We perform the trimming on a year by year basis, and for small and large firms
separately. Our procedure is stricter than the standard practice in the literature, where
outlier selection is done on the whole sample, or, at best, on a yearly basis only. Size is,
however, the outstanding feature, which can substantially influence the trimming results24.
Section A.2 gives an idea of the distributional differences according to size. Finally, we
select only those firms with enough consecutive annual accounts to enable the ADL(4)
model to be estimated. Because the model is estimated in differences, we need at least
seven consecutive years. This leaves us with around 12 % of the initial sample.
                                                     
24 As we estimate a specific investment equation for each size/industry separately, an even more restrictive
option would be to perform the trimming accordingly.35




in % of total
1. all firms 1544105 100.0%
2. profit-maximising firms 1539150 99.7%
3 (b) strictly positive total assets and total liabilities 1539005 99.7%
3 (b) strictly positive real fixed assets 1399056 90.6%
3 (c) strictly positive depreciation rate 1390863 90.1%
4 (a) available (∆ ) investment/capital ratio 808413 52.4%
4 (b) available (∆ ) and positive user cost of capital 770957 49.9%
4 (c) available (∆ ) cash flow/capital ratio 770943 49.9%
4 (d) available (∆ ) and positive value added 740998 48.0%
5. trimming 658643 42.7%
6 (a) sample to estimate an ADL(2) 307984 19.9%
6 (b) sample to estimate an ADL(3) 242185 15.7%
6 (c) sample to estimate an ADL(4) 190554 12.3%
Next, we will evaluate the representativeness of our final sample.  Table A.2. gives a first
indication. It shows that the remaining firms represent around 40% of the profit-
maximising sample (after selection step 2), in terms of both value added and employment,
and 20% of aggregate economic activity as shown in the national accounts25.
Table A.2 : Representativeness of the final sample (1) over 1991-1998
in % of  national accounts  (2) in % of the  profit-maximising
sample (3)
value added value added employment
agriculture   0.00   4.29   4.08
industries 46.04 47.72 45.99
energy 44.89 65.86 64.98
manufacturing 46.22 45.73 45.16
construction 31.61 49.64 47.68
commercial services 16.14 40.22 41.63
other   0.01 10.83 21.13
total 19.94 43.88 43.67
(1) Final sample refers to the sample in step 6(c) in table A.1.
(2) Aggregation of the final sample value added over value added reported in the national accounts
(source: the Institute for National Accounts)
(3) Aggregated value added (employment) over the final sample, over aggregated value added
(employment) of the sample of profit-maximising firms; the profit-maximising sample refers to the
sample in step 2 in Table A.1.
Since, comparing the final sample with the profit-maximising sample, the percentage of
observations of the final sample in the sample of profit-maximising firms (12%) is smaller
than the percentage of value added or employment of the final sample in the profit-
maximising sample (44%), there might be a bias towards large firms. However, the
                                                     
25  Note that in the final and profit-maximising sample we included refineries in the manufacturing sector
rather than in energy.36
number of small firms still remains quite large. As shown in Table A.3, more than 40% of
firms hire at most five employees. Note that the proportion of large firms is highest in the
manufacturing sector.
Table A.3 : Number of employees in the final sample over 1991-1998
all firms manufacturing construction services
average 34.06 86.91 19.42 24.35
median 7 16 7 6
fewer than 1 employee 10.79% 4.41% 7.32% 13.21%
fewer than 5 employees 44.05% 24.13% 40.46% 49.78%
fewer than 10 employees 62.84% 39.98% 61.67% 68.55%
fewer than 50 employees 92.38% 79.66% 93.43% 95.11%
fewer than x employees stands for the percentage of firms with less than x employees,
Comparing value added and employment sector shares of the national accounts with those
of both samples, Table A.4. indicates that manufacturing and construction may be
somewhat over represented in our final sample.
Table A.4 : Comparison of the relative importance of sectors in 1995 in the
national accounts, in the profit-maximising sample and in the final sample












agriculture   1.5   0.5   0.0   2.5   0.7   0.0
industries 21.7 44.5 50.1 19.7 38.4 41.4
energy   2.9   4.2 6.4   0.9   1.7   2.7
manufacturin
g
18.9 40.4 43.8 18.8 36.7 38.8
construction   4.8   7.1   7.7   6.6 10.0 10.9
commercial
services
52.2 47.7 42.2 51.9 50.7 47.6
others 19.8   0.1   0.0 19.4 0.2   0.0
(1) source:the Institute for National Accounts
(2) source: the National Office for Employment
Finally, since use of a dynamic model and estimation in first differences is very costly in
terms of the number of observations lost, there might also be a concern that we are only
analysing the investment behaviour of mature firms. We therefore calculated some basic
statistics for the final sample and the profit-maximising sample. The median and median
absolute deviation from the median shown in Table A.5 show that the distribution of the
major variables in both samples is very close. Of course, the final sample has a lower
dispersion than the initial one owing to the focus on the interpercentile range, and its is
more symmetric for all variables, especially for the investment rate and cash flow. But the37
median is almost unaffected. We can thus conclude that our selection has not introduced a
pronounced representation bias.
Table A.5: Comparison of the median and the median absolute deviation
from the median (MAD) in the profit-maximising and final sample
Investment rate Investment growth rate
median MAD median MAD
Π  max final Π  max final Π  max final Π  max final
1991 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10 -0.04 -0.02 0.22 0.15
1992 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.20 0.13
1993 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.18 0.11
1994 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.16 0.10
1995 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.16 0.10
1996 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.10
1997 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.15 0.10
1998 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.15 0.10
Apparent user cost of capital Apparent user cost of capital growth
rate
median MAD median MAD
Π  max final Π  max final Π  max final Π  max final
1991 -1.84 -1.84 0.42 0.34 0.10 0.09 0.41 0.36
1992 -1.86 -1.84 0.42 0.34 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.22
1993 -1.76 -1.74 0.38 0.31 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.21
1994 -1.76 -1.74 0.35 0.28 0.08 0.03 0.23 0.20
1995 -1.70 -1.70 0.35 0.27 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.14
1996 -1.81 -1.81 0.40 0.33 -0.07 -0.08 0.29 0.28
1997 -1.77 -1.81 0.38 0.32 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.19
1998 -1.89 -1.97 0.41 0.33 -0.13 -0.15 0.19 0.18
Value added Value added growth
median MAD median MAD
Π  max final Π  max final Π  max final Π  max final
1991 11.94 12.76 0.93 0.93 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.11
1992 11.86 12.67 0.92 0.93 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.11
1993 11.77 12.52 0.91 0.92 -0.01 -0.02 0.16 0.12
1994 11.73 12.47 0.90 0.92 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.11
1995 11.70 12.41 0.89 0.92 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.11
1996 11.47 12.19 1.01 1.03 -0.14 -0.14 0.24 0.18
1997 11.42 12.09 1.04 1.05 0.00 -0.01 0.20 0.15
1998 11.38 12.04 1.04 1.05 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.14
Cash flow Cash flow growth
median MAD median MAD
Π  max final Π  max final Π  max final Π  max final
1991 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.12 -0.05 0.39 0.16 0.10
1992 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.10 -0.05 0.36 0.15 0.09
1993 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.09 -0.05 0.33 0.14 0.08
1994 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.09 -0.02 0.30 0.13 0.08
1995 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.09 -0.02 0.28 0.12 0.07
1996 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.09 -0.02 0.28 0.11 0.07
1997 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.28 0.11 0.07
1998 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.31 0.11 0.07
Π  max refers to the sample profit-maximising firms38
A2. Construction of the variables
We define the variables as follows:
•   The computation of the capital stock is based on the perpetual inventory method, i.e.,
applying the following formula
(a.1) P
I









with Kit representing the real capital stock, P
I
st the sector-specific deflator on gross
capital formation and δ i the firm-specific depreciation rate26.
•   The firm-specific depreciation rate was estimated as the median depreciation
expenditures on capital, over the years in which the firm exists.
•   The user cost of capital takes into account forward-looking expectations. It is based on
the apparent interest rate faced by the firm, iit27. We do not incorporate taxes in the
definition of the user cost, although we do subtract interest subsidies from debt





























st is the sector-specific deflator on gross capital formation and Pst is the
sector-specific value-added price.
•   Cash flow is defined as net profits plus depreciation28.
•   Value added is expressed in real terms.
•   We use 2-digit NACE codes for investment and value-added prices aggregated for 23
sectors.
Table A.6 summarises these variables for large and small firms. Large firms experienced a
smaller decline in value added, face a lower user cost and have a higher cash flow ratio.
Small firms have a more volatile investment rate.
                                                     
26  The capital stock at time t results from investments undertaken over different periods. Therefore, using
current investment prices to deflate the nominal capital stock is not correct. The perpetual inventory
method allows to circumvent this problem, except for the initial stock, Ki0.
27  For small firms, we consider the ratio of financial charges minus interest subsidies over debt, rather than
the ratio of debt charges minus interest subsidies over debt, because small firms do not have to provide
this information.
Some authors rely on an estimate of the firm-specific interest rate based on the market short- and long-
term rates and the debt structure of the firm, which may be appropriate for capturing the marginal user
cost, the cost of a new investment project. However, this indicator ignores all firm-specific differences in
the cost of credit. Such differences may arise, for example, because firms are in a riskier sector, or because
firms are young, or because they have weak bank relationships.
28  Again the definition differs for small and large firms according to data availability.39
Table A.6: Summary statistics over the final sample
large firms mean std. dev. maximum 75% median 25% minimum
I/K 0.169 0.233 3.007 0.208 0.107 0.045 -0.266
∆ log VA -0.013 0.323 5.708 0.106 0.004 -0.105 -7.984
∆ log UCC -0.009 0.559 3.498 0.232 0.011 -0.263 -3.239
CF/K 0.346 0.657 15.834 0.379 0.216 0.124 -2.263
log VA 14.692 1.280 21.661 15.359 14.576 13.907 6.419
log UCC -2.006 0.567 1.144 -1.685 -1.976 -2.312 -4.886
small firms mean std. dev. maximum 75% median 25% minimum
I/K 0.194 0.344 5.750 0.227 0.093 0.029 -0.287
∆ log VA -0.056 0.413 5.430 0.111 -0.018 -0.170 -8.157
∆ log UCC -0.007 0.474 3.040 0.213 0.009 -0.227 -2.662
CF/K 0.235 0.283 5.239 0.298 0.181 0.102 -1.044
log VA 11.991 1.224 16.266 12.861 12.048 11.208 3.168
log UCC -1.777 0.558 0.857 -1.471 -1.777 -2.106 -4.34840
Appendix B: Robustness with respect to alternative trimming procedure
In this appendix we trim our sample using a different procedure for deleting outliers. As
before, we trim the same variables as previously, year by year. In order to define the
trimming threshold we rely on the median absolute deviation from the median. More
precisely, for each variable, y, we consider only the firm-year observations whose
deviation from the median does not exceed six times the median of their deviation from
the median:
(b.1) ) y ( median y it it − <6. [] ) y ( median y median it it −
This procedure is more robust to outliers and yields a more symmetric distribution than
the interpercentile range. The value of 6 is ad hoc and it may be regarded as too
conservative since it yields a sample which is half the interpercentile range. Thus the aim
of this section is to check the robustness of our conclusions with respect to a more robust
and more conservative trimming procedure.
The results are presented below. Table B.1 considers all sectors combined and
distinguishes between small and large firms. Comparison with Table 3 confirms our
previous findings that the total effect of past investment is negative for small firms and
that small firms have a higher long-run elasticity with respect to cash flow.
Tables B.2 and B.3 make comparisons with Tables 4 and 5 and distinguish between both
(broad) sectors and size. The results confirm our previous findings, i.e. (1) the sum of the
coefficients on past investment rate is more negative for small firms, (2) the long-run
elasticity of investment to user cost fluctuations is greater for small firms, and non-
significant for small services, (3) the long-run elasticity of investment to value added
fluctuations is higher for large firms, (4) the long-run cash flow sensitivity is higher for
small firms, (5) construction is more sensitive to user cost fluctuations than other sectors,
and (6) manufacturing is more sensitive to value added fluctuations than other sectors.41
Table B.1: ADL(4) model for large and small firms for the sample
trimmed according to the MAD criterion (b.1)
all firms large firms small firms
 coef t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat
It-1/Kt-2  0.011  0.642  0.043**  2.491 -0.008 -0.682
It-2/Kt-3  0.006*** -3.012 -0.061*** -4.428 -0.020*** -2.748
It-3/Kt-4  0.006*** -2.823 -0.029** -2.350 -0.018*** -2.686
It-4/Kt-5  0.006 -0.159 -0.064*** -5.560  0.007  1.023
Σ( It-j/Kt-j-1)  0.030***  2.975 -0.110** -2.395 -0.039*** -2.790
∆ log(UCCt)  0.006  0.096 -0.003 -0.411 -0.002 -0.298
∆ log(UCCt-1)  0.003 -1.382 -0.012*** -2.668 -0.005 -1.429
∆ log(UCCt-2)  0.003 -0.820 -0.010** -2.347 -0.002 -0.714
∆ log(UCCt-3)  0.002** -2.044 -0.008** -2.318 -0.005** -2.019
∆ log(UCCt-4)  0.002* -1.839 -0.006** -2.065 -0.003 -1.588
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j)  0.015  0.256 -0.038*** -3.827 -0.018* -1.953
Long-run elasticity  0.016 -0.034 -0.017
∆ log(VAt)  0.025  0.189  0.067**  2.475  0.028  1.075
∆ log(VAt-1)  0.009**  2.112  0.038***  3.275  0.023**  2.291
∆ log(VAt-2)  0.007  1.387  0.024**  2.466  0.011  1.375
∆ log(VAt-3)  0.006  1.124  0.010  1.144  0.008  1.192
∆ log(VAt-4)  0.004  1.004  0.002  0.291  0.005  1.038
Σ∆ log(VAt-j)  0.051  1.235  0.140***  2.700  0.075  1.636
Long-run elasticity  0.052  0.126  0.072
CASHt  0.086***  3.942  0.102  1.587  0.347***  3.804
CASHt-1  0.031 -0.343  0.013  0.523  0.001  0.023
CASHt-2  0.011 -0.116  0.004  0.299 -0.001 -0.098
CASHt-3  0.008  0.576 -0.014 -1.164  0.012  1.234
CASHt-4  0.010  0.899  0.013  0.879  0.013  1.097
Σ CASHt-j  0.146***  2.974  0.118  2.564  0.371  7.281
Long-run elasticity  0.150  0.106  0.357
 statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value
nb, obs  75444  12641  62267
nb, firms  14876  2393  12514
Sargan  174.775  0.002  133.433  0.286  181.576  0.001
m1 -63.352  0.000 -25.835  0.000 -55.064  0.000
m2  0.652  0.514 -1.145  0.252  1.177  0.239
2nd step GMM Arellano-Bond estimates of the investment equation (4) over 1991-1998
the constant and time dummies are not shown
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level42
Table B.2: ADL(4) model of investment for large firms for the sample
trimmed according to the MAD criterion (b.1):sector estimates
manufacturing construction services
 coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat
It-1/Kt-2  0.011  0.642  0.043** 2.491 -0.008 -0.682
It-2/Kt-3  0.006*** -3.012 -0.061*** -4.428 -0.020*** -2.748
It-3/Kt-4  0.006*** -2.823 -0.029** -2.350 -0.018*** -2.686
It-4/Kt-5  0.006 -0.159 -0.064*** -5.560  0.007  1.023
Σ( It-j/Kt-j-1)  0.030***  2.975 -0.110** -2.395 -0.039*** -2.790
∆ log(UCCt)  0.006  0.096 -0.003 -0.411 -0.002 -0.298
∆ log(UCCt-1)  0.003 -1.382 -0.012*** -2.668 -0.005 -1.429
∆ log(UCCt-2)  0.003 -0.820 -0.010** -2.347 -0.002 -0.714
∆ log(UCCt-3)  0.002** -2.044 -0.008** -2.318 -0.005** -2.019
∆ log(UCCt-4)  0.002* -1.839 -0.006** -2.065 -0.003 -1.588
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j)  0.015  0.256 -0.038*** -3.827 -0.018* -1.953
Long-run elasticity  0.016 -0.034 -0.017
∆ log(VAt)  0.025  0.189  0.067** 2.475  0.028  1.075
∆ log(VAt-1)  0.009**  2.112  0.038*** 3.275  0.023**  2.291
∆ log(VAt-2)  0.007  1.387  0.024** 2.466  0.011  1.375
∆ log(VAt-3)  0.006  1.124  0.010 1.144  0.008  1.192
∆ log(VAt-4)  0.004  1.004  0.002 0.291  0.005  1.038
Σ∆ log(VAt-j)  0.051  1.235  0.140*** 2.700  0.075  1.636
Long-run elasticity  0.052  0.126  0.072
CASHt  0.086***  3.942  0.102 1.587  0.347***  3.804
CASHt-1  0.031 -0.343  0.013 0.523  0.001  0.023
CASHt-2  0.011 -0.116  0.004 0.299 -0.001 -0.098
CASHt-3  0.008  0.576 -0.014 -1.164  0.012  1.234
CASHt-4  0.010  0.899  0.013 0.879  0.013  1.097
Σ CASHt-j  0.146***  2.974  0.118 2.564  0.371  7.281
Long-run elasticity  0.150  0.106  0.357
 statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value
No. of obs  3112  1532  7951
No. of firms  628  271  1485
Sargan  124.073  0.507  133.192  0.291  129.961  0.363
Wald - lag 4  2.831  0.586  41.927  0.000  26.396  0.000
m1 -12.148  0.000 -9.164  0.000 -20.433  0.000
m2  1.7  0.089 -0.712  0.476 -2.423  0.015
2nd step GMM Arellano-Bond estimates of the investment equation (4) over 1991-1998
the constant and time dummies are not shown
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level43
Table B.3: ADL(4) model of investment for small firms for the sample
trimmed according to the MAD criterion (b.1): sector estimates
manufacturing construction services
 coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat
It-1/Kt-2  0.020  0.977 -0.077*** -5.025 -0.013 -0.912
It-2/Kt-3 -0.037** -2.057 -0.036*** -2.849 -0.025*** -2.849
It-3/Kt-4 -0.037** -1.994 -0.016 -1.339 -0.022*** -2.657
It-4/Kt-5 -0.001 -0.081  0.010  0.913  0.002  0.296
Σ( It-j/Kt-j-1) -0.056 -0.941 -0.119 -1.617 -0.058** -2.189
∆ log(UCCt) -0.039*** -2.660 -0.081*** -3.366  0.006  0.875
∆ log(UCCt-1) -0.021** -2.327 -0.026** -2.191 -0.003 -0.885
∆ log(UCCt-2) -0.015* -1.740 -0.005 -0.513 -0.003 -0.786
∆ log(UCCt-3) -0.010 -1.303 -0.005 -0.654 -0.005* -1.740
∆ log(UCCt-4) -0.003 -0.428 -0.002 -0.296 -0.005** -1.989
Σ∆ log(UCCt-j) -0.087** -2.411 -0.118** -2.234 -0.010 -1.027
Long-run elasticity -0.082 -0.106 -0.009
∆ log(VAt)  0.030  1.386  0.038  1.197  0.025  0.854
∆ log(VAt-1)  0.065***  3.304  0.022  1.528  0.021*  1.813
∆ log(VAt-2)  0.044**  2.024  0.004  0.333  0.009  0.971
∆ log(VAt-3)  0.002  0.084  0.000  0.027  0.010  1.181
∆ log(VAt-4) -0.006 -0.492 -0.006 -0.651  0.006  1.147
Σ∆ log(VAt-j)  0.133*  1.817  0.059  0.908 0.071  1.262
Long-run elasticity  0.126  0.053 0.067
CASHt  0.234***  2.922  0.134  1.511  0.279***  2.642
CASHt-1 -0.005 -0.095  0.053* 1.801  0.026  0.654
CASHt-2 -0.003 -0.090 -0.012 -0.635  0.017  1.185
CASHt-3  0.085*** 3.074 -0.011 -0.695  0.014  1.174
CASHt-4 -0.014 -0.438 0.019 1.022  0.011  0.727
Σ CASHt-j  0.298*** 4.126  0.184*** 2.708   0.347***  5.550
Long-run elasticity 0.282 0.164  0.328
 statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value  statistic  p-value
No. of obs  5888  12999  43281
No. of firms  1272  2488  8732
Sargan  106.894  0.878  132.184  0.313  172.055  0.003
Wald - lag 4  0.796  0.939  2.645  0.619  6.367  0.173
m1 -18.282  0.000 -26.305  0.000 -47.384  0.000
m2  2.299  0.022  0.055  0.956  1.182  0.237
2nd step GMM Arellano-Bond estimates of the investment equation (4) over 1991-1998
the constant and time dummies are not shown
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level